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I. Introduction
With the U.S. occupying the sole position of leadership in the world in terms of economic and military strength, it has increasingly found itself in situations where the demands of global and regional stability have been placed squarely on the shoulders of national leaders. Faced with the prospect of ethnic, religious, cultural, and nationalistic clashes that are no longer held in check by the two superpowers, and given the increased threat posed by transnational actors, every agency involved in the application of national power has struggled to develop policies to guide them through the minefield posed by the fractious nature of the "New World Disorder." 1 The attacks of September 11, 2001 , however, galvanized the sluggish bureaucratic machinery and served as a focal point to provide some clarity and direction for the U.S.'s national security strategy. With respect to trans-national, or global, terrorism, the U.S. has delineated the steps it intends to take, most notably:
1. Disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations through direct action against terrorist organizations of global reach, and against any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction. 2. If necessary, exercise the right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists. 3. Support moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation 2 But while the steps outlined seem to cover several aspects of national power and the application of that power across the spectrum of international interaction, it fails to clearly identify an enemy. In fact, nowhere in any of the literature addressing global terrorism does identification of the enemy proceed any further or with any greater specificity than the mention of Al-Qaeda and other known terrorist organizations. Whether this has occurred as a result of a political desire to avoid turning the current conflict into a clash of civilizations as envisioned by Samuel Huntington, or because the transnational nature of some of these organizations makes it difficult to identify a traditional enemy in the nation state sense, the fact remains the U.S. has been unable, or unwilling, to adequately describe the enemy or the nature of the war currently being waged.
But the time has come for the U.S. to face the reality that has long been festering throughout the Middle East but has been wished away for over 80 years, a reality that has manifested itself in a global Islamic insurgency embodied and led by Osama bin Laden and AlQaeda. If the U.S. fails to identify the war on terror as essentially a counterinsurgency effort, then geographic combatant commanders will never be able to accurately assess the proper ways, means, and ends necessary to determine a calculus for victory, nor will they be able to properly identify the enemy's center of gravity to assist them in that calculation. To that end, this paper seeks to provide a better understanding of the enemy through an analysis of the contextual and ideological framework from which they operate. Next, based on an understanding of the enemy's motivations, an analysis of the nature of the war and the strategy utilized by the enemy will place the conflict within a strategic and operational framework from which to determine possible courses of action.
Finally, based on this information, options to address the threat will be highlighted.
II. The Enemy
"Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." Sun Tzu 3 Much has been written regarding Al-Qaeda's organization, ideology and strategy, but much of the analysis seems to be incomplete. In fact, U.S. interpretation of Al Qaeda's ideology is perhaps the greatest analytical failure facing strategy and policy planners in their war against terrorism. Indeed, the U.S.'s politically motivated rhetoric to limit the conflict to a war against terrorism versus an ideological struggle of immense proportion not only limits the scope of the conflict, but perhaps falsely constrains what might constitute victory in the future. Whether guilty of viewing the problem through the prism of western ideals and cultural mores, or of simply taking a politically expedient step to avoid escalating the situation into a true clash of civilizations, the U.S. has analogized the conflict to such an extent that it may be impossible to view the strategic landscape as it truly exists. As Michael Vlahos asks in his remarkable and insightful essay, Terror's Mask: The Insurgency Within Islam, "Can we defeat an enemy that we are afraid to name?" 4 In addition to the question above, the central question that needs to be asked is: Does the ideology espoused by Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda followers truly represent a fringe, or radical doctrine that can be discredited amongst the greater Muslim population, or does it touch on something much deeper and central to Islamic identity and orthodoxy? To answer this question combatant commanders must not only see Al Qaeda as they see themselves, but also as other Muslims see them. Although the U.S. has branded Al Qaeda a terrorist network as though it was a cartel of criminal gangs, it enjoys the support, sometimes passive though it may seem, of millions of Muslims across the globe. As such, it is critical to ask what the relationship between Islamist militant and Muslim societies is. 5 Historical Context: Whereas western culture views history in linear, quantifiable terms of past, present and future, and relies heavily on analysis as the coin of this rational, quantifiable realm, the Muslim culture views history as a never ending story where the time-space continuum represents an ongoing narrative of existence. For them the past, present and future is all one, an ever-present mythos that informs their existence and view of the world around them. Thus, when Muhammad came out of the desert in the seventh century as a holy man with a message to unite all Arabs under the word and law of Allah, the story of his journey and ultimate success became part of the mythoheroic continuum of Islamic identity. 6 Muslims; a celebration of the eternal struggle or continuum mentioned earlier that identifies
Islamic experience in mytho-heroic terms. 12 In a very real and practical sense, then, Islamic law, or shari'a, as it applies to jihad, highlights the centrality of perpetual struggle as a condition of the religion. It does not make provision for relations with the infidel, except in so far as it benefits the Ummah, and so provides an existential concept of life-the heart of Islam's ethos-which leaves no room for any point of view or way of life other than Islam. This is not the radical ideology of Islamist fundamentalists. This is the nature of Islam.
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As a result, it is easy to see how Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda view themselves. Like
Muhammad before him, he is the warrior prodigal with his band of mujahidin, sweeping out of the desert to renew a degenerate Arabia. An Arabia run by a subverted kingdom, which in turn is run by foreign infidels. 14 If this, then, is how the "enemy" views the struggle, is the current U.S. focus on the military and financial arms of Al Qaeda's organization enough to ensure lasting victory? What is the nature of the current war, and how does Al Qaeda's operations fit within that framework?
III. The Nature of the War
"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." Carl von Clausewitz 15 If jihad, as described above, were indeed a central tenet of Islam and a rallying cry for those dispossessed Muslims who feel the very core of their faith is under attack, how then would one characterize the nature of the war currently being waged? While the US has characterized the conflict as a war on terrorism, the subtext of the rhetorical phrase nevertheless can be inferred as a war on the violently militant factions within Islam. This narrow definition of the enemy as a criminal subset of a greater cultural whole, however, has created a US strategy of limited means to achieve its ends and fails to identify the greater threat.
Al Qaeda, on the other hand, with the nominally passive, oftentimes active, support of the global Muslim population, is waging a total war against the US, Israel and the secular/ murtad, regimes in the Middle East in an effort to renew the Ummah and reestablish the caliphate and universal shari'a under its rule. Ralph Peters perhaps puts it most succinctly in his essay, "Rolling Back Radical Islam" when he states, "We are not at war with Islam. But the most radical elements within the Muslim world are convinced that they are at war with us. Our fight is with the few, but our struggle must be with the many." 16 Most insurgencies follow a classic vector that has a beginning, middle, and end, and exhibit characteristics that can be considered universal. First, at the heart of any insurgency is the primacy of legitimacy and political cachet. 18 It is the goal of any insurgency to overturn the status quo and establish its own political agenda, and it is here that Al Qaeda has struck a nerve within the Middle Eastern psyche and tapped into a deep reserve of antipathy and despair that has served to heighten its standing within the Muslim community. The second characteristic shared by most insurgencies is the importance of effective psychological warfare, or the propaganda war for the "hearts and minds" of the people. 19 As noted above, the Middle East provides fertile ground in which to sow the seeds of rebellion, and no one has capitalized more on the regional potential for recruitment than Al Qaeda. Indeed, so much importance is placed on spreading its message and vision to the Muslim world that Al Qaeda has made media and publicity one of its four operational committees, co-equal with the military, finance and business, and fatwa and Islamic study committees in its organizational hierarchy.
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Manipulating and exploiting mass media and information technologies to garner support for his mission, Osama bin Laden has waged an information warfare campaign drawing on Islamic orthodoxy and the mytho-heroic zeitgeist described earlier that has effectively denied combatant commanders counter-information warfare access to the Middle Eastern population. In essence he has made it a battle for the "hearts and souls," vice the "hearts and minds" of his target audience, severely limiting possible U.S. response in the region. Lacking any credibility in the Muslim community's eyes, the U.S.'s counterinsurgent rhetoric espousing economic development, nation building, and democratization may not be germane to meeting the regional, yet revolutionary, strategy of Al Qaeda who emphasizes the idealized return to fundamental religious values and the rejection of both technological and political modernity. 21 The third characteristic, and perhaps the most thorny for combatant commanders to contend with, is the use of protraction on the part of insurgents to buy time in an effort to erode the legitimacy of the target government(s), while by default gaining increased legitimacy for their own cause. As Michael Vlahos puts it:
While the established and legitimate [governments] must have as their goal the destruction of the insurgent movement, the insurgency needs only to survive to deny the established authority its goal . . . Insurgencies thus can play a waiting game, because the longer they survive the more their authority grows, and the weaker the strategic position of the establishment becomes.
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Al Qaeda, and more importantly bin Laden, have demonstrated remarkable resilience and resistance to U.S.-led efforts to curb their ambitions. Their deeply clandestine nature and sophisticated vetting of potential recruits has aided in maintaining the organization in the shadows, while their hit-and-run tactics continue to remind both enemies and allies alike of the long term viability of the organization and its ability to flaunt the best efforts of those it seeks to overthrow.
The longer the organization and its charismatic leader endure, the greater its following will become as more and more Muslims across the globe see resistance and jihad not as abstract theological dreams, but rather as legitimate and effective means to give action to their collective disenfranchisement and anger.
The fourth, and final, characteristic shared by most insurgencies is the reliance on unconventional forces, tactics, and strategies. 23 At least at inception, every insurgency has begun its struggle from a position of weakness in almost every sense, from manpower, to military strength, to popular support, to financial solvency. Armed only with an idea, or ideal, a small band of loyal followers, and conviction in their cause, these embryonic insurgent movements had no choice but to resort to unconventional warfare in order to gain the legitimacy and political standing necessary to affect their aims. In today's environment, the unpredictable and virtually undetectable nature of Al Qaeda, coupled with the lethality presumably at its disposal, makes it and any future movements that follow in its footsteps the single greatest challenge to national and global security for the foreseeable future. As a result, by virtue of Al Qaeda's guerrilla tactics and strategies, and the U.S. response to the threat, Osama bin Laden has gained that most coveted of all insurgent prizes:
Legitimacy. Whether the U.S. calls Al Qaeda terrorist, criminal, or murdering is irrelevant. The fact that Al Qaeda's actions have forced the U.S. to respond speaks louder to bin Laden's target constituency than any rhetorical semantics the U.S. can proffer.
Given the analysis above, if combatant commanders accept the notion that the nature of the current war on terror is in fact a civilizational insurgency requiring a counter-insurgency strategy across the spectrum of conflict to affect a true and lasting peace, what might that strategy look like, and what might it entail for the geographic combatant commanders whose mandate it would be to execute the strategy?
IV. Altering the Strategic Landscape
Some would argue that the case presented thus far presents a "monolithic" view of Islam that simply does not exist. As Middle Eastern scholar Judith Miller points out, ". . . Islamic movements themselves are increasingly divided by personal rivalries, ideological differences, and disputes over money." 24 While this is undoubtedly true, it is also true that in times of crisis groups of individuals bound by some commonality will band together in collective defense when One approach would be to adopt classic counterinsurgency techniques to garner victory.
Within this realm combatant commanders could adopt three courses of action that could be undertaken either in series, or in parallel: 1) Counter organizational targeting; 2) Counter leadership targeting; or 3) The indirect approach, or capturing "the hearts and minds" of the target constituency. All three strategies, whether taken as singular approaches or as parallel means to attack the problem, have had their successes in the past.
As applied to Al Qaeda, a case could be made that the U.S. has embarked on a de facto counterinsurgency campaign through its efforts to target elements of the organization while simultaneously attempting to eradicate its leadership. While this approach has produced noticeable effects, it arguably ignores the most critical element in the successful conduct of the war, namely the "passion" portion of the omnipresent Clausewitzian trinitarian analysis of conflict. As long as Muslim passions run high based on the perceived threat to Islam the U.S. represents, can America ever truly claim victory in the war, or will the seeds of hatred and discontent continue to germinate in the fertile soil of the Middle East? What if the U.S. was successful in its goal of eradicating Al Qaeda? Would victory then be assured, or would it merely be the removal of a malignant piece of the greater cancer?
If the combatant commanders were to reject that strategy as ultimately failed in its logic, what next? Much scholarly attention has been paid to the coordination of all instruments of national power to address the current situation. Simultaneous application of the diplomatic, informational/public relations, military, and economic means of enticement, coercion, appeal and promise has gained great popularity amongst those seeking a comprehensive approach to national security. While arguably better than the counter-organizational targeting solution, does it achieve the U.S.'s ultimate ends?
In the diplomatic realm it is becoming increasingly difficult to determine what constitutes friend and foe. While the U.S. may gain advantage with a particular leader in the region one day, that same leader may espouse anti-American polemic the next in an effort to deflect the growing dissatisfaction and unrest of the citizenry. Ironically these leaders, who are too entrenched and brutal to be immediately overturned, but are too weak to survive without U.S. support, seem to be engaged in a delicate high wire act between reliance on the U.S. versus the condemnation such support brings from their publics. The only thing current diplomacy could ever hope to achieve in such a mutable, untenable and shifting environment is the short-term bolstering of an increasingly fragile status quo.
In the propaganda war U.S. prospects are even more grim. As previously mentioned, Osama bin Laden has captured the "hearts and souls" of the Muslim population. How, then, could the infidel U.S. ever hope to achieve a foothold on popular opinion? First off, all is not lost when With regard to the leading nations of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the time has come for the U.S. to make it unequivocally clear that its vector is behind the moderating nations of the region regardless of any economic hardship friction with the Egyptians and Saudis would surely engender. It is no longer a matter of "supporting corruption or inviting chaos," indeed both are readily abundant as it is, rather a shift in political priority needs to take place that Muslims will perceive as the West's concern and empathy for their attempts at self-determination and improvement of their condition.
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V. Conclusion
While the war on terror at first blush seems an intractable and overwhelming conflict with no clear course for victory, quite the opposite is true. In the final analysis, war is war, and insurgency is insurgency. Regardless of the year, the technology, or the surface motives, conflict boils down to the basic need to exert political dominance over another entity.
In the case of the current war on terror, the enemy the U.S. needs to confront isn't Al Qaeda per se, but rather the conditions that gave rise to Al Qaeda in the first place. Those conditions are what provide Al Qaeda its source of strength, its legitimacy, and its manpower. If the U.S. were to attack that center of gravity through the means described above, then the insurgents would no longer have that support base and would eventually be driven into ineffectual isolation.
More importantly, however, would be the disarming of future bin Ladens through a Muslim-led renewal of the Ummah consistent with Islamic law in the context of the modern world.
Like the Reformation before it, Islam will eventually have to come to terms with the changing world and either learn to adapt and moderate as necessary, or be continually plagued by idealists like Osama bin Laden. In any event, if a cultural shift within Islam is going to take place, it is going to have to be coincident with a political shift in Washington. The time has come where the status quo is no longer adequate for the people of the Middle East or America's "vital" interests.
Indeed, the U.S.'s vital interests should necessarily shift away from resources and encompass those very people just mentioned in a vigorous struggle for their hearts, minds, and souls. Only then can lasting peace and true victory be declared. 
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